Foreign Policy Research Institute A Nation Must Think Before it Acts Is the United States Losing the Sahel?
Is the United States Losing the Sahel?

Is the United States Losing the Sahel?

Bottom Line

  • The Sahel’s vulnerability to climate change and extremist movements makes it a chokepoint, affecting the continent’s security.

  • For a variety of reasons, several countries are interested in the Sahel and are engaged in intense competition for influence.

  • The US position in the Sahel is weakening, which will negatively impact its ability to deal with international extremist movements and cedes the ground to malign Russian influence.

  • Changing the dynamics in the Sahel will require hardheaded, clear-eyed thinking and a change in current strategy away from over-reliance on the military and a shift toward traditional diplomacy.

In 1949, when Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and proclaimed the People’s Republic of China, it ignited a rancorous debate in the United States over who “lost China.” The blame game persisted well into the 1960s, partly because of the American view that communism was a monolithic ideology whose threat was now doubled with the Chinese added to the Soviets, partly because Senator Joseph McCarthy accused Americans of colluding with communist powers in his demagogic campaign, and partly because it was seen as an effective political theme to campaign on. McCarthy even went so far as to pillory the Asian experts in the Department of State, the so-called China hands undermining US interests, when all they did was accurately predict Mao’s victory.

There is currently a somewhat analogous situation occurring regarding Africa’s Sahel—although it is less likely to see the McCarthy-style posturing, since Africa is not the priority or perceived threat that China was during the age of the “Red Scare.” Low priority notwithstanding, recent events in this strategically important region of the African continent point to the distinct possibility of US presence and influence waning, Russian influence rising, and a degradation of US ability to deal with international extremist movements. Should this come to pass, there will no doubt be a lot of finger pointing and blaming for the loss.

Africa’s Chokepoint 

A 3,670 mile strip of land stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea, the Sahel is a transition zone that averages 600 miles wide between the relative humid savannas of the south and the arid Sahara of the north. The core group of countries in the Sahel are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

The Sahel has historically suffered prolonged droughts, excessive heat, soil erosion, and desertification from a combination of climate change, over-farming, overgrazing, and overpopulation. The Sahel is also the epicenter of terrorist violence in Africa. By 2021, 35 percent of the terrorist-related deaths globally were in this region, with Boko Haram, Islam State, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb among the extremist groups represented. Some 3.5 million people in the Sahel have been displaced because of extremist violence and thousands have been killed.

This impoverished region has also experienced the most political instability on the continent. By the end of March 2022, there had been five successful coups in the region—in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan—and coup attempts in Guinea Bissau and Niger. In July 2023, after the democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum threatened to fire the commander of the presidential guard, the army arrested him, suspended the constitution, and installed General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the guard commander, as head of state.

The turbulence and instability stretching across the continent spells trouble for Africa, but also for the rest of the world. The Sahel has effectively become a chokepoint that potentially negatively impacts global security.

Why the Sahel is Important

 There is a new “scramble for Africa,” with a focus on the Sahel. The main nations vying for influence and presence in the Sahel are the European Union, France, and the United States representing democratic countries, and Russia and China on the opposing team, with Iran also making inroads. Despite all the previously mentioned problems, the competition is intense.

The Sahel is important to the European Union because the countries in the region, especially Niger, are essential to help stop mass illegal immigration into the European Union. France is eager to maintain its economic dominance of its former colonies, which is threatened by increased anti-French sentiments in many of them, particularly in the Sahel. The US interest is primarily security related. The United States had a $100 million drone base and 1,000 troops at Agadez. The government of Niger has asked the United States to withdraw its troops and close the base. For Russia, the Sahel offers an opportunity to reestablish its presence and prestige in Africa after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Chinese—though it could serve as an alternative to the Sahel’s traditional alliances—is primarily interested in access to the region’s rich natural resources.

In general, the Sahel is viewed as important for the following reasons:

  1. It has an abundance of natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas, and lithium.
  2. It is strategically located between North and sub-Saharan Africa.

Where is the United States in the Sahel?

The US Government’s military focus on the Sahel, specifically support of counterterrorism operations, has created ethical dilemmas and caused the government to engage in verbal gymnastics that could negatively impact American relations with other African countries and have the potential to undermine American credibility globally.

When the military in Niger seized power on July 26, 2023, the US Government hesitated to call it a “coup.” A Pentagon spokesperson described the situation in Niger as “fluid” and said that it was “just too soon to characterize the unrest as a coup.” The administration called it a “coup attempt.” On the line in Niger, in addition to $200 million in humanitarian and economic support that is legally limited after a coup, was the US drone base at Agadez and 1,000 American troops engaged in counterterrorism, surveillance. and intelligence gathering. The administration did suspend military cooperation with Nigerien forces but seemed to hold out hope that the elected civilian leadership would be restored. Rising tensions with the “attempted coup” leaders and the arrival of Russian military advisors in Niger in April 2024, however, moved the needle. The United States agreed to withdraw its troops in compliance with a March decree from the junta suspending military cooperation with the United States. The status of the drone base has not been announced.

In early April, the air force chief of Chad ordered a halt to all US operations at an air base near N’Djamena, where 100 US troops were training local military. The Pentagon is calling the removal of troops a “temporary step” and expects that talks of security cooperation with Chad will resume after May 2024, elections. Chad’s former ruler, Idriss Deby, was killed leading troops against rebel insurgents. The army installed his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, formerly commander of the presidential guard, as president, in what many called an “institutional coup.”

It should not be ignored that in the case of both Niger and Chad, pushback against cooperation with the United States followed closely on the heels of the juntas of both countries establishing closer ties with Moscow.

With France being ejected from most of its former Sahel colonies and with more and more of them drifting into Moscow’s orbit, in addition to being ruled by miliary juntas who show no signs of relinquishing power, the United States faces a serious dilemma. With the United States and France out, Russia (and in some cases Iran) move in to fill the gap. This will degrade American ability to combat international terrorism and imperil US ability to influence events in the region. Efforts to engage coup governments to negotiate roadmaps and timetables for a return to democracy are limited. When Russian disinformation turns populations against the United States and governments (coup or otherwise) demand that it leaves, there are few choices. The fact that the Russian presence will not solve the problems that many of the coup leaders claim that France failed to solve gives no reason to rejoice. It just means that an already unstable region is likely to descend further into chaos which can spill over into neighboring countries.

The view that it is “unwise to completely withdraw from countries having challenges in democratic governance” fails to pass the logic test when those countries evict the United States. No amount of wordsmithing can change that. When the United States is told to go, what are its options? Given that Russian disinformation often paints the United States as neocolonial a refusal to leave when asked would only validate it.

The bottom line is that the American position in the Sahel at the moment is weak and showing no signs of recovering in the near term.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The situation in the Sahel has the potential to spread to neighboring countries, and lack of cooperation from countries like Niger and Chad imperil US ability to forestall international terrorist attacks. In addition, allowing countries like Russia and Iran to have unfettered and unchallenged access to a region with so many critical resources threatens the health of the free world economy.

The question, though, is what can the United States really do about the situation?

 A good starting point would be that proposed by the US Institute for Peace: less counterterrorism-related activities and more targeted diplomatic efforts. While US security assistance in the Sahel under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in theory addresses the range of issues contributing to extremism, in reality Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership programs have been overwhelmingly militaristic, with little to show for the millions spent other than civilian casualties, human rights abuses, and corruption.

Given this, then, how should US policy be demilitarized?

  1. The first step is an in-depth and realistic assessment of the political situation in the Sahel and a hardheaded evaluation of what American programs have achieved (or failed to achieve) to date.
  2. Incorporate the North African countries into the State Department’s Africa Bureau in recognition that in terms of extremist activities, the relationship between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa is closer than North Africa is to the Middle East.
  3. Integrate assistance programs, but tailor them to specific countries. This would recognize the interrelatedness of issues like climate change and narcotics trafficking and enable more coordinated efforts, but by making them country specific, they can be tailored to fit the situation on the ground.   

These three steps won’t solve the Sahel’s problems, but they are a start. The final action that the US government needs to take is to recognize that the mess that is the Sahel was not created overnight and will not be solved in a short time. The United States must be prepared to be in it for the long haul or it will just achieve more of the same bitter failure of the past.

Image: AFRICOM/Master Sgt. Becky Vanshur